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CAUSATION IN PRIVATE TORT LAW:
A COMMENT ON KELMAN
ALAN SCHWARTZ*

Two theories of tort liability influence modern tort law. The corrective justice theory ("CJT") holds that it is actionable to cause harm to
another wrongfully; a victim so injured can recover his losses from the
injurer. The efficiency theory ("ET") holds that the risk of accidents
should be imposed to minimize the sum of accident and accident avoidance costs. This theory implies that a victim can shift his losses to another only if such a shift would increase welfare. Both theories of tort
require causal determinations. A court applying the CJT must make two
kinds of causal determinations: (1) ascertaining the relation between antecedent actions, inactions, or states of affairs and the particular event at
issue; and (2) attributing to one or more of the candidate causal factors
the appellation "the cause." As examples of the former, factual inquiry:
did the bullet that defendant fired injure the victim? Did the smoke emitted from defendant's plant contribute to the cancer the victim suffered?
To understand the latter attribution inquiry, one should realize that
events are products of sets of jointly sufficient antecedent conditions.
Suppose, as an illustration, that a house burned down because a defective
television emitted sparks that ignited a nearby flammable curtain, and
the house lacked a smoke detector or sprinkler system. The set of jointly
sufficient conditions that produced the event "house burned down" included the television, the curtain, and the homeowner's failure to take
precautionary actions. If the owner sues the television manufacturer, the
question for a court attempting to apply the CJT is whether the untoward event was caused by the selling of the defective set or the presence
of the curtain, etc.; the court must attribute the event at issue to "a
cause." This inquiry is necessary because the CJT holds liable only persons who have wrongfully caused harm. The ET collapses the attribution inquiry into the factual inquiry because the pursuit of efficiency
requires liability to be assigned so as to minimize accident costs; hence,
the ET would impose the risk of loss in the burning house illustration on
the manufacturer, homeowner, or both, depending on such factors as
each candidate actor's ability to take precautions and his access to infor* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Richard Craswell, Michael
Moore and Stephen Morse made helpful comments.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

mation. There is no need, within efficiency theory, to make a singular
causal attribution.
The difficulty of making causal attributions, whether for scientific,
historical, or legal purposes, has been recognized for centuries and speculation about them has produced a large, complex literature.' The difficulty of resolving factual causal problems also is extremely well knownit is, after all, the task of scientists to know what causes what-but this
difficulty has achieved considerable salience for legal theorists in recent
years because of the rise of toxic torts. Toxic tort cases often involve
poorly understood relations between antecedent conditions and events.
For example, did chemical X alone cause Y set of cancers? Did X
merely increase the probability that Y set would occur? If so, by how
much? Questions like these have provoked a large body of literature
dealing with burden of proof questions and such institutional issues as
whether the judicial system is well suited to resolving "probabilistic causation" cases, how the system could be modified to improve its functioning, or whether administrative solutions to toxic tort problems are
2
preferable.
Mark Kelman's thesis 3 is that factual and attribution inquiries are
too difficult for juries to make. Since both the CJT and ET presuppose
the ability of juries to make them, these theories of tort, he argues, are
irretrievably flawed. Society's only sensible alternative to the private law
tort system that the CJT and ET purport to guide is the regulatory solution, which his paper concludes by advocating. This comment argues
that Kelman fails to sustain his thesis.
I.

CAUSE AND THE

CJT

Kelman claims that the CJT faces three problems. His initial con1. The seminal work is D. HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 1-165 (P.H. Nidditch, 3d ed. 1975). See also J. ELSTER,
EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE (1983); J. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY
OF CAUSATION (1974); P. SUPPES, A PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY (1970); Mulaik, To-

ward A Synthesis of Deterministic and Probabilistic Formulationsof Causal Relations by the Functional Relation Concept, 53 PHIL. SCI. 313 (1986).
2. All of these issues are extensively discussed in three recent symposia. See Rethinking Tort
and Environmental Liability Laws. Needs and Objectives of the Late 20th Century and Beyond, 24
HOUS. L. REV. 1-219 (1987); CriticalIssues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 459-818 (1985); CatastrophicPersonalInjuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 415-622 (1984). A
recent paper also dealing with the difficulty of making factual findings in toxic tort cases and the
appropriate institutional response to this difficulty (which cites extensively to the literature) is Brennan, Causation Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation, Mimeo, Harvard Law School (1986).
3. This thesis is set out in Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in
Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579 (1987) (Professor Kelman's article appears in
this symposium issue.).
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cern, which is not directly relevant to causation, rests on the fact that any
corrective justice theory is parasitic on a just set of entitlements; B cannot claim that A wrongfully caused harm to B's legitimate interests unless these were B's legitimate interests. The problem for corrective
justice here, Kelman thinks, is that "liberal culture" is unable to engage
in the type of justification analysis required to legitimate entitlements.
Such analysis entails "straightforward" dialogue about morally preferred
desires and values, but "[s]traightforward dialogue about desires and val4
ues is precisely what value skeptical liberalism believes impossible."
There are two difficulties with Kelman's objection. First, a version of
corrective justice can coexist with this kind of value skepticism. Value
skeptics commonly believe that a set of entitlements is justified if persons
bargaining under appropriate conditions would agree on the elements of
the set; unanimous consent legitimates entitlements although each participant in the bargaining process believes himself to hold an incommensurable substantive vision of the good. 5 The CJT implies, on such a view,
that no one should wrongfully cause harm to another's "bargained for"
entitlement. Second, if Kelman means by a value skeptic a person who
believes that it is absurd or unproductive to engage in moral dialogue,
value skeptics are an extremely small percentage of the inhabitants of
liberal culture. In recent years, there has been an efflorescence of moral
theory, much of it devoted to entitlement justification issues. John Rawls
is an early example. 6 The presence of this vast literature refutes Kelman's claim that corrective justice theories are impossible because liberals cannot and do not discuss moral theory.
Kelman is on firmer ground in arguing that causal attribution
problems create difficulties for the CJT but his discussion focuses on a
manageable concern and slights a serious one. Respecting the former,
consider again the burning house hypothetical. A CJT theorist must
make a causal attribution-did the sparking television or the lack of precautions by the owner cause the fire? People asking such questions have
reasons for wanting the answers and these reasons influence the methods
by which the answers are found. Put more precisely, causal attributions
are relative to the purposes of attributors.
One common purpose is to "explain" why events happen in the
4. Id. at 586.
5. E.g.. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 97-116 (1962); D.
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
6. J. RAWiLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 310-15 (1971).

It is unhelpful to cite to one or two

papers or books when the set of works by authors in the liberal tradition that deal with moral theory
is so large. A recent sophisticated introduction to this literature with many references is Symposium
on Explanation and Justification in Social Theory. 97 ETHICS 6-277 (1986).
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sense of providing an intuitively plausible interpretation of a given
event's "history." These sorts of causal explanations are not commonly
sought for ordinary events but are sought for relatively unusual onesfires in homes, world wars. Among people who analyze causal issues in
this way, two theories for identifying cause have developed. The first is
that one should look for unusual causes-factors not normally present in
the environment-as explanations of unusual events. 7 For example, an
automobile accident is a relatively unusual event. Its cause from this
viewpoint is more likely to be identified as "defective brakes" or "a
drunken driver" rather than heavy traffic, even if the particular accident
would not have happened without the presence of many other cars; traffic is considerably more common than defective brakes. And in the first
illustration, flammable curtains and the absence of smoke alarms seem
more common than televisions that issue dramatically large sparks; the
defective television thus is likely to be held "the cause."
The second common explanatory criterion is replaceability. For example, person C negligently starts a fire; it is about to go out and person
D deliberately puts paraffin on it. The fire flares up and burns houses. In
the event, the acts of C and D were necessary to the fire-causes of itbut C's acts were more easily replaceable; had the fire gone out, D likely
would have torched his own paraffin. The more difficult to replace cause
is "the cause"-that is, a better explanation of the event-because it is
less likely that the event would have occurred without this cause than
without the other causes. 8
7.

See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING:

ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSI-

BILITY 142-43 (1970); M. WHITE, FOUNDATIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 119 (1965).
8. See J. MACKIE, supra note I, at 127-29. Mackie explains that "in themselves all actual
causal factors are equally causes of the result for which each was necessary in the circumstances, but
from some human point of view one such factor may be selected as the more important cause, or
even as the sole cause." Id. at 129 (footnote omitted). The actions of D in the example above were
more important than those of C because D presumably would have torched the houses in any event.
Kelman apparently believes that this type of case poses an unsolvable causal attribution problem
because it is also plausible to describe D's conduct as "doing whatever is needed to burn [the houses]
down." Kelman, supra note 3 at 605. Under this description, Kelman seems to claim, C did not
cause the accident at all. Since the description of D's behavior just given is as plausible as the
description in the text above, it is impossible to say whether a person-C here-caused a harm
"whenever we believe another actor would have succeeded in causing the harm in his absence." Id.
at 606. This view is incorrect because events and actions exist (at least to some extent) independently of the descriptions observers attach to them. For example, that Jane either "drove too fast"
or "lost control" or "was a victim of modern technology" does not alter the fact that her car crashed
into a tree. So here, that D "poured paraffin on the fire" or "would have done whatever is necessary" does not alter the fact that C started the fire and thus performed an act that was necessary for
the actual catastrophe that occurred. Therefore, unless Kelman takes the unusual view that whether
an action occurred at all- whether C started the relevant fire- is itself a function of how actions
are described, he seems bound to accept the conclusion that C's actions are a cause of the fire, which
is to say that the concept of causation is untroubled by the description ambiguity Kelman raises. A
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A second general purpose that animates attribution inquiries is to
prevent or encourage particular forms of behavior. 9 A juror with this
purpose in mind should pick from among the set of necessary antecedent
conditions of an accident that factor which is likely to cause harm in the
general run of cases-the defective brakes in the car illustration aboveor the factor most likely to respond appropriately to tort liability-this
time, the maker of defective brakes. The factor that it is instrumentally
sensible to burden is "the cause."
Causal attributions never can be free from the possibility of controversy for two reasons. First, they are made relative to attributors' purposes and different attributors may have different purposes for asking
causal questions. If so, they may choose different necessary conditions as
causes.' 0 In the automobile accident example above, a traffic engineer
aware that the accident rate rises with increases in traffic volume may
classify the accident as just one more product of a normal rush hour,
while a jury concerned to deter bad cars may focus on the brakes. Second, people may disagree on the plausibility of causal interpretations,
just as they disagree on the plausibility of aesthetic or historical interpretations. That causal attributions are "loose" for these two reasons is no
reason for abandoning the attempt to make them. Courts and juries
often have common purposes and thus will analyze causal problems in
similar ways; most "interesting" causal questions are philosophers' and
law professors' inventions while cause seldom is controversial in the
cases. Also, causal interpretation criteria commonly have a confined application. Unusual events seldom have several unusual causes."I Moreover, it is a mistake to demand more from the available tools than they
can provide. That the causes of war or of a particular neurosis can be
controversial cannot sensibly imply that the enterprises of history or psychiatry should be abandoned. For those to whom the CJT appeals, disagreements over cause are justifiably depressing or challenging but are
not reasons for giving up.
A serious problem for the CJT is that liability impositions sometimes seem appealing although causation is absent or cannot be proved.
This difficulty follows from the common notion of cause as a counterfactual. To say that an antecedent factor F is a cause of event E is to say
deeper response to Kelman's views on this issue is in Moore, Thomson's PreliminariesAbout Causation and Rights, 63 CM.-KENT L. REV. 497 (1987) (Professor Moore's article appears in this issue.).
9. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 7, at 144-45; J. MACKIE, supra note 1, at 127-29.
10. This point is clearly made in Dray, Causal Judgment in Attributive and Explanatory Contexts, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 19 (No. 3, 1986).
11. See M. WHITE, supra note 7, at 122-23.
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that had factor F not happened, and had the world otherwise run on just
as it did, the event E would not have happened; antecedent factors are
causes just when and because their presence matters. 12 This intuitively
appealing view of cause can become unappealing in common legal contexts. Two illustrations are discussed. First, consider the cause of action
in products liability law for failure to warn, and suppose that Company
Y manufactures a product that explodes if mixed with water. The product's label warns against mixing the contents with water but says nothing
about the possibility of explosions; users could infer that water would
just ruin the product, not produce harm. A consumer accidentally permits water to mix with the product and is injured by the resultant explosion. He later truthfully testifies that he did not read the label and never
reads labels; had the instructions been crystal clear, he candidly admits,
the accident would have happened anyway. The notion of cause as a
counterfactual implies that the improper warning was not the cause of
the explosion in the illustration above; for had the improper warning
been replaced with a better one, and the world otherwise run on just as it
did, the accident would have happened anyway. A court applying the
CJT thus should find against the consumer. Yet to require plaintiffs to
prove that they would have followed clear warnings-to exculpate the
manufacturer here because it did not cause the accident-seems unwise;
liability should attach because it will encourage people to sue and thus
3
police the adequacy of warnings.'
A second example of the difficulty to which making cause a prerequisite of liability can lead is illustrated by the toxic tort case that Kelman
12. This view is clearly put by Lewis: "We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it.
Had it been absent, its effects-some of them, at least, and usually all-would have been absent as
well." Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 557 (1973). Kelman devotes several pages to an argument
with Richard Wright. Kelman, supra note 3, at 602-04. Wright seemingly supposes that an antecedent action-the emitting of a small amount of pollution in his illustration-can be a cause of a
harm although the harm would have occurred without the action because enough pollution was
emitted by another actor. See Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1791-94
(1985). Kelman correctly argues that such a view of cause can lead to serious difficulty, but the
problem lies more with Wright than with the concept of causation itself: Wright individuates the
harm inappropriately. The harm that actually occurred in his example-the cancer-resulted from
all the pollution that was emitted; hence, the action of every emitter was necessary to this specific
harm-i.e., a cause of it. That the same type of harm-a cancer, say-would have occurred had less
pollution been emitted is irrelevant to one making a causal attribution in the particular case at hand.
13. Courts generally do not require plaintiffs to prove that they would have followed adequate
warnings. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976). A related criticism of the CJT's
causation requirement, on the ground that the requirement can impede the pursuit of distributive
justice, is found in Alexander, Causationand Corrective Justice.- Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. &
PHIL. 1 (1987).
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discusses. Suppose that persons in the general population get a cancercancer L-with probability p. Persons exposed to emissions from a particular factory get cancer L with probability q > p. Both p and q are less
than one half. All persons with cancer L sue the factory, whose defense,
in every case, is that plaintiff cannot prove causation. This is a good
defense under the CJT because, had the emissions never escaped and had
the world otherwise run on as before, a nontrivial percentage of the
plaintiffs would have developed cancer anyway; the emissions did not
cause cancer L in this set of plaintiffs. Thus, each plaintiff must prove
that he was not in this set-that the emissions mattered as to him. Given
the state of current science, no plaintiff could carry this burden of proof
in many toxic situations. Once more, the CJT implies no liability yet
liability is appealing; defendant's actions increased the number of cancers
in the world and it should be made to pay, either so that it is faced with
the appropriate incentive to invest in safety or because it was responsible
for considerable harm.14 The CJT is a problematic tort theory because it
exculpates defendants in cases where most persons' moral intuitions imply that tort liability should be imposed.
Kelman's actual analysis of the probabilistic causation case is difficult to follow. 15 He could be saying either of two things. First, every
person with cancer L should be able to recover the appropriate percent of
their damages, but the courts' commitment to the causation requirement
bars such suits; the courts will not accept probabilistic evidence but in14. Liability under the ET would face defendant factory with the appropriate incentive to invest in safety. To see how this could be done, suppose as in the text above that p is the background
probability of cancer L; q is the probability of getting cancer L faced by those exposed to emissions
from defendant's factory; Ci is the costs of cancer L to a given plaintiff; and N is the total number of
persons exposed. Then qN people get cancer L. To require defendant to bear the costs it causes, it
should be made to pay, in total:
q-P qN
I Ci.
q
I
For example, if q = 5%, p = 2%, N = 1,000 and Ci = $100,000 (per cancer victim), defendant
should pay $3,000,000. Hence, if everyone who contracts cancer L sues, courts should not inquire
into causation in particular cases, but rather should award each plaintiff $60,000; then defendant
would be induced to behave appropriately. This analysis of probabilistic causation is becoming
common; it is most thoroughly worked out in Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the
Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & ECON. 587 (1985). The courts, however, are reluctant to
base liability on such probabilistic calculations. See Brennan, supra note 2. This may be because
point estimates of disease probabilities (q = .05) are difficult to make for toxic harms, given what is
known about these harms. An interesting suggestion that full compensation is inappropriate in
probabilistic causation cases but that juries should be permitted to discount awards in a less formal
way than this note suggests is in Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of
Persuasion and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). Another interesting scheme that
attempts to adapt the probabilistic causation concept to the case of heterogeneous plaintiffs is
Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987).

15. Kelman, supra note 3, at 593-600.
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stead require proof that defendant's emissions in fact caused a given
plaintiff's cancer. That plaintiffs should prevail in this kind of case is
correct normatively, if one accepts the ET, and that plaintiffs seldom
would prevail under the current cases is true as well, but neither point is
novel.' 6 Second, persons who are exposed to cancer L but do not have it
should be able to recover from defendant the expected value of the increased risk they face of getting cancer L, so these persons can purchase
market insurance or self-insure, but the courts' belief that causation cannot occur until injury occurs bars these suits. This characterization of
the cases is correct. 17 Suits for such "ex ante compensation" are not
inconsistent with the CJT, however, if the notion of a wrongful invasion
of a person's rights is broadened to include invasions that create risks of
harm; and the extension seems natural, at least to some commentators,
since to face a person with a risk is to increase the person's current

costs. ' 8 The stronger objection to suits for ex ante compensation, rather,
come from within the ET itself; awarding ex ante compensation creates
moral hazard problems and so may increase accident costs. 19 The relevant point here, however, is that Kelman cannot plausibly criticize the
CJT because it prohibits ex ante compensation; rather, as said above, the
CJT is questionable because its insistence on causation as a prerequisite
20
for liability can prohibit any compensation at all.
16. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases. A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Shavell, supra note 14; Brennan, supra note 2;
Note, supra note 14.
17. A seemingly typical view is: "Until ... the plaintiff develops cancer ...

the causation of

cancer has not occurred." Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 520 (5th Cir. 1984)
(refusing to allow plaintiff to recover compensation for being exposed to a risk of cancer that the
plaintiff had yet to contract), rev'd en banc, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.), questions certified, 757 F.2d
614 (5th Cir.), certification denied, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985), on reh'g, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (affirming district court judgment), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986).
18. This argument is made in Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensationfor Tortious
Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 789-91 (1985). Referring to the illustration in note 14, if 1,000 exposed persons sued for ex ante compensation, each should recover $3,000 ($3,000,000 + 1,000). A
view that the CJT prohibits ex ante compensation is in Weinrib, Toward A Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37, 45-48 (1983).
19. To understand this concern, refer again to the illustration discussed in notes 14 and 18 and
suppose that each person who will be exposed to defendant factory's emissions is paid $3,000 ex ante.
Since none of the people could later sue if they contracted cancer, having been fully compensated ex
ante, the defendant has no incentive to invest in discovering new ways to reduce risks of harm.
Further, the defendant has an incentive to act in a less safe fashion then he would otherwise have
since all potential plaintiffs have purchased insurance coverage (or had the opportunity to do so) and
thus these persons lack a strong incentive to monitor the defendant's behavior. Monitoring also is a
public good to the full set of potential victims and so may be done insufficiently in any event.
20. The textual analysis also illuminates the issue of preemptive causation. As an example, D,
plans to shoot P; D, plans to and does fatally poison P and D,, while P lays dying, shoots and kills
him. There are two ways to discuss this case. First, if the relevant event is individuated as "P's
death," neither actor caused it: (i) D, did not cause the death because, had she not acted, P would
have died anyway; D2 would have-indeed, did-shoot him; (ii) D, did not cause the death because
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To summarize, causation issues create difficulties for the CJT but
not the difficulties Kelman stresses. Rather, the CJT requires proof of
causation before liability can be imposed while the instrumental morality
that is influential in everyday life sometimes implies liability though causation cannot be established. This plainly is a reproach to the CJT, but
not to the private law tort system itself, which can rest on other
justifications.
II.

CAUSE AND THE

ET

Kelman claims that the ET is unsuitable as a private law tort theory
because the relation between antecedent factors and costly events is not
perfectly knowable. He asserts that "efficiency may not be attained in
the absence of perfectly determinate causation judgments"; 2 1 that maintaining a "belief" in the law's efficiency is difficult-impossible, as it
turns out-"in the absence of consensus accounts of causal nexus between conduct and consequence";22 that "we cannot know how much
damage is caused [by an act], even if we know what it means to cause
damage."' 23 These "empirical problems" are "insuperable and widespread," infecting "[alltort cases." ' 24 Kelman could be saying any of
three things here, two of them incorrect and the third insufficiently developed. First, unless causation questions can be answered "perfectly"unless, that is, science can answer all questions put to it-consequentialist moral theories cannot be implemented practically. This position is
erroneous and Kelman, though he sometimes writes broadly, is unlikely
to hold it; his proposed regulatory solution itself requires an administrahad she not acted, D, would have-indeed did-fatally poison P. If the event is individuated as "P's
particular form of death," then D2 caused it; P actually died from the bullet, not the poison. Were
P's heirs to sue defendants under the CJT, no one would be liable under the first description and only
D2 would be liable under the second. Neither result is acceptable to most observers because consequentialist reasons exist-to deter harm-that justify sanctioning both defendants. Kelman discusses a variant of the preemptive causation case at length and concludes that the ET alone resolves
the issue satisfactorily. Kelman, supra note 3, at 608-17. He does not generalize appropriately from
this correct conclusion-viz, that the CJT is questionable because of its insistence on cause as a
prerequisite to liability, but that an efficiency motivated private law tort system is not similarly
disabled.
21. Id. at 624.
22. Id. at 622.
23. Id. at 637 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 579-80 (emphasis in original). Kelman also claims that a "libertarian or . ..efficiency-theorist" believes that no uncertainty about cause exists; these theorists, he asserts, are victims of "the liberal fantasy ...that we can assess straightforwardly the expected damage the polluter
causes and let him decide whether to damage or not." Id. at 633-34. This claim is false. As the
extensive literature cited in notes 2 and 16, supra, show, liberal theorists struggle frequently and selfconsciously with issues of causal uncertainty. Another recent and provocative example from the
field of epidemiology is Seiler & Scott, Mixtures of Toxic Agents and Attributable Risk Calculations,
7 RISK ANALYSIS 81 (1987).
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tor to make empirical causal findings on subjects, such as the harm-causing potential of alleged carcinogens, about which, as Kelman knows,
25
considerable uncertainty exists.

Kelman instead may be claiming that causal determinations are too
complex for juries in all cases. 26 His analysis here recalls a problem for
the ET, but it is not a problem having to do with cause. The problem is
this: the ET works by creating incentives for firms to engage in risk minimizing behavior, the incentives being the imposition of costs on firms as
a result of their accident causing activities on the one hand, and the freedom from bearing those costs on the other, when the law is negligence
and firms behave appropriately. Thus, the ET supposes that firms can
calculate expected accident costs. As these costs are partly a function of
jury behavior, that behavior too must be predictable. In recent years,
tort law has relaxed restrictions on recoveries for "mental" harms-pain
and suffering and emotional distress. Jury verdicts for such harms are
relatively difficult to predict, but whatever problems this poses for the ET
are not causal. To take a simple example, suppose defendant drove negligently and ran into plaintiff, who suffered physical injuries and great
pain. Plaintiff can recover for her pain and suffering, but no money metric exists to transform injuries of this type into liability assessments;
rather, the jury decides, in an intuitive way, how much the pain and
suffering is "worth." Everyone would agree that defendant here caused
plaintiff's pain by negligently crashing into her. The problem in damage
prediction that this illustration poses results from the very imperfect
knowability of psychological states. And the problem is thought to be
serious because it puts a wedge between the tort goal of creating appropriate incentives for safety, which demands the predictable application of
rules, and the tort goal of compensating victims fully, which seemingly
compromises this demand. 27 The resultant conflict may appear frequently in tort cases, but finding causation is a difficulty in very few of
these cases.
Finally, Kelman might be saying that some tort cases, particularly
those involving toxic harms, raise causation issues that are too difficult
for juries to resolve. This claim is plausible, although not original, 28 nor
does Kelman contribute to the difficult question, which cases should be
25. See, e.g., id. at 633-34.
26. See id. at 635-36.
27. The lively debate among products liability theorists and many legislators respecting
whether pain and suffering awards should be permitted, eliminated or capped reflects the "liberal
theorists' " awareness of the problem that mental losses create.
28. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 2 & 16.
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resolved under tort law and which resolved elsewhere. Also, were this
last claim valid, a large class of cases would remain appropriate for private law to govern under the moral theories that now prevail.
III.

KELMAN'S REGULATORY SOLUTION

Kelman proposes a regulatory solution to the problems his paper
discusses; tort cases should be handled by a "regulator." The practical
details of this proposal are not developed. It is unclear whether Kelman
wants each state to have its own regulator or whether the regulator
should be a federal official; nor is it clear whether the regulator is to
supplant tort law entirely, so that she decides cases involving motor vehicle accidents and invitee liability, or whether the regulator is to handle
only important or difficult matters. Because the administrative aspects of
Kelman's proposal are unspecified, it seems best to focus on its
substance.
Kelman's regulatory solution is problematic because it asks regulators to do too much. His regulator, in deciding whether to permit or
prohibit activities, would compare costs and benefits, as juries now are
instructed to do; she also would explicitly consider confidence intervals
when making probability assessments and take "relative error costs" into
account. He means by this a variant of standard risk of error analysisthe weighing more heavily of probabilities of especially awful consequences. 29 The regulator also must consider separate activities that synergistically produce harm, proscribing that activity that is "best
eliminated" on (it seems) cost benefit grounds. 30 None of these proposals
are controversial, but the making of them entails a difficulty for Kelman:
the proposals belie much of the analysis and the overarching ethos of his
paper, for if any set of decision makers can make the cost benefit analyses
Kelman believes are wise, his objections to efficiency theories of tort are
reduced to questions of institutional detail. For example, Kelman could
not object to a decentralized tort system that explicitly pursued the efficiency goal if the role juries now play is performed by local administrative agencies, such as a state or city EPA, or by special masters in
complex cases. Kelman meets this objection by assigning additional
tasks to his regulator, and it is these tasks that create difficulties.
Kelman wants the regulator to assess the benefits of activities not (or
not only) by asking what benefits affected persons believe that they derive
from these activities; rather, the regulator is to use a "social welfare func29. See Kelman, supra note 3, at 634-36.
30. Id. at 636-37 (emphasis omitted).
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tion [which] might . . . (or might not) contain imbedded distributive
judgments;" the regulator may "without being inefficient, reasonably ban
an activity because her own estimates of the benefits of the activity are
lower than the actors'." A regulator who uses this social welfare function "may be quite confident that there would be little loss if an activity is
banned" that "turns out to be less harmful" than it initially appeared
because the regulator has already decided that the activity's benefits are
so low. 3' Kelman is unclear here, but the likely possibilities raise
qualms.
The reference to efficiency in the quoted language suggests that Kelman wants the regulator to maximize the utility of all affected persons.
If the expressed preferences of these people are not taken as proxies for
utility, Kelman must mean that the regulator knows better than these
people what is utility maximizing. She would know this only if she could
make precise interpersonal utility comparisons, but it seems unlikely that
Kelman attributes the ability to do this to any regulator that real life is
likely to turn up. Indeed, it is the inability to make interpersonal utility
comparisons that produces the difficulty in assessing pain and suffering
losses described above. Kelman apparently believes that this difficulty is
an embarrassment to the ET and he gives no reason to think that the
difficulty would not embarrass his regulator as well.
Alternatively, Kelman may believe that his regulator has (or will
develop) independent views of which activities are beneficial. A regulator who disliked sports, for example, could "quite confidently" ban high
school soccer because it sometimes injures children; she would know that
"there would be little loss" because the sport is really worthless. It seems
unlikely that Kelman wants his regulator to act in this fashion, however,
(unless he believes the regulator will have privileged access to the truth)
because the regulator would then have veto power over everything people
do that could cause accidents. But if the regulator is not to weigh the
benefits of actions by making interpersonal utility comparisons or by consulting her own vision of the good, how is she to make the sort of cost
benefit analyses that Kelman advocates? Kelman's regulatory solution is
just too inchoate to evaluate seriously.
CONCLUSION

Kelman could exhibit the superiority of a regulatory solution to tort
cases by establishing that the current largely private law system is so
irretrievably flawed that almost any administrative regime would do bet31.

Id. at 634-35.
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ter. Or he could describe in detail a proposed regulatory scheme that
seems likely to outperform what now exists. The initial two parts of this
comment show that Kelman has failed at the first strategy; the last part
shows that he has failed at the second.

